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1. Introduction
Endogenous or schumpeterian growth models have been presented by
Paul Romer (1986; 1990), Robert Lucas (1988), Paul Segerstrom, et.
al. (1990), Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1990), and Gene
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991). These models have great
potential for understanding economic growth because they
incorporate three stylized facts into the theory of economic
growth: (1) the limits economies of scale impose on product
differentiation; (2) innovation is endogenous; and (3) innovation
has spillover effects.
The motivation for endogenous growth theory is that it gives
a tentative explanation for three stylized facts about economic
growth. The first is the point by Angus Maddison (1991) and Romer
(1986) that per capita growth rates in the industrialized countries
have increased over the past several centuries. The second is that
free international trade appears to have a much larger impact on
economic growth rates than can be accounted for by neoclassical
trade theory (De Long and Summers, 1991; Gould and RUffin, 1992).
Third, government policies have a substantial impact on economic
growth rates (Barro, 1991).
The wonderful new book by Grossman and Helpman (GH)
synthesizes most of the contributions under one roof. It explains
the new models simply and without excessive mathematical formalism.
The economics, rather than the mathematics, is stressed. While
the reader is treated to simple explanations, he is also confrontedwith a rather flat landscape without the signposts to distinguish
the trivial from the profound.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify and slightly
generalize the basic endogenous growth model. Romer (1990) and
Grossman and .. Helpman. (1991) assume that the -distribution of
knowledge around the world is irrelevant; I prove the basic
theorems without this assumption. I shall try to state the basic
results of the model in terms of lemmas, theorems, and corollaries
in order to bring out as clearly as possible the assumptions on
which each result is based. A single factor of production is
-assumed so that I ignore a major theme of Grossman and Helpman
(1991) dealing with certain factors being well suited for research
and development in a Heckscher-Ohlin model.
2. Monopolistic competition and International Trade
The Grossman-Helpman model is really just a dynamic version of the
Krugman model of monopolistic competition (Krugman, 1979; 1981).
Accordingly, this section begins with a simple explanation of trade
with monopolistic competition. The Krugman model was inspired by
the seminal work of Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz (1977).
Suppose there are L people and workers. Each consumes n
varieties of some differentiated product. There are n
monopolistically competitive firms. The production of each
variety is denoted by x~. There are economies of scale in the
production of each variety. The production function for each firm
is
(1)
2where lk is the input needed to produce xk units of the kth
variety. Economies of scale exist because the parameter a is a
positive constant; and marginal costs are constant because b is a
positive constant. Demand and costs are perfectly sYmmetrical so
that the production-of each"variety is the same.. Thus, we can let
lk = 1 and x k = x. Since there are n varieties, full employment
requires that nl = L or
n = L/(a + bx). (2)
The elasticity of demand facing each variety is exactly the
same so that each of the n firms charge the same price,
p = bw/a, (3)
where w is the wage rate, bw is marginal costs, and l/a is the
markup (0 < a < 1). Free entry implies that price drops to the
level of average costs, so that
p = w(a + bx)/x = wa/x + wb. (4)
Combining (3) and (4) we get
x = aa/b(l-a). (5)
SUbstituting into (2) yields the equilibrium number of products
n = L(l-a)/a. (6)
The number of products increases with the size of the population,
the higher the markup (i.e. the lower a) on products, and the
lower fixed costs.
The utility function popularized by Dixit and stiglitz (1977)
can be used to justify the markup pricing rule:
U = (~=oS(X",)i!)lli. (7)
We can also interpret (7) as a production function in which the U
3is a final product and the xk's are intermediate inputs (Ethier,
1982). It can be shown that the demand for good k is
x~ = E (PkF'/{'£.tJPt.)!=l.] , (8)
where E = ~/(~-a), E is expenditure, and Pk is the price of variety
k. If n is very large, then E ~s the price elasticity of demand.!
Indeed, in the sequel we will assume that n defined on a continuum.
The parameter a will be in the range (O,~) when E > ~; it also
measures the elastic values of the elasticity. The value of this
parameter is that the famous equation, MR = P(~-~/E) can be written
as MR = Pa.
Suppose countries A and B share the same preferences and
technology. If they engage in free trade in goods, the number of
products in the world will be:
nl! + n.!! = (Ll! + ~) p-a)la. (9)
Which varieties each country produces is indeterminate: only the
total number produced in a country is known. Consumers in both
countries purchase equal quantities of all varieties so that there
is trade between the two countries: the basis for trade is
economies of scale. The gain from trade consists of having more
variety.
with the utility function in equation (7), the gain from trade
is easily seen. Since all the Xk's are the same, the utility
function can be written as
U = (nl! + n.!!)llix • (10)
Clearly, as the number of products increases, the utility of the
representative consumer rises. We see from equation (5) that the
4size of firm, x, remains constant.
3. Endogenous Growth
The step between the Krugman model and the GH model is a short one.
Basically, GH make two changes in the Krugman model. First, the
fixed cost a ..J.n..the.proQuct.ion.functi<m in (2), 1 = a + bx, should
reflect technological spillovers. Second, to take account of
economic growth they consider a representative consumer maximizing
an intertemporal utility function over an intertemporal bUdget
constraint.
Technological Spillovers
'i«>mer(i'990) introduced two basic ideas, borrowed by Grossman and
Helpman. First, there are technological spillovers so that
innovations often lower the cost of making future innovations.
Second, there are so many possible combinations of physical
elements that the acquisition of new knowledge is not sUbject to
diminishing returns to scale.
To capture these ideas, we can think of the number of
products, n, as a measure of the stock of human knowledge. From
now on we will treat n as a continuous variable. Let a J be the
amount of labor required in country j per unit of the flow of
product development in country j, fiJ. Grossman and Helpman use the
Romer (1990) assumptions:
a J = c/nJ , (11)
a J = cl(n!! + nll.), (12)
where c is a positive constant. In the case of (11), technological
spillovers are limited to domestic innovators; in the case of (12),
5technological spillovers are additively global.
A key feature of (12) is that the distribution of world
knowledge is irrelevant. Assumption (12) is the obvious extension
of specification (11) for an autarkic economy. Thus, it is not
surprising tl;1a,t, under.,this .assumption,the global, economy works like
a single, but larger, integrated economy. However, there is
nothing natural about (11). It is just as plausible to assume
diminishing returns to knowledge in a single, isolated country.
For example, China's self-imposed cultural isolation from the rest
of the world between 1000 and 1500 A.D. appeared to even limit the
usefulness of the spectacular innovations, such as printing and
gunpowder (McNeill, 1963, Chapter X). From this perspective when
the rest of the world is introduced it might well have a
mUltiplicative effect on the productivity of knowledge in
innovation. A more general assumption would be
aJ = aJ (nA , n~). (13)
We can now preserve the common property of both (11) and (12),
namely, constant returns to all the knowledge inputs. 2 In other
words, if knowledge doubles everywhere in the world, the labor
required to produce a new good ("knowledge") would fall by one-
half. This captures Romer's idea (Romer, 1990) that there are
infinite discovery possibilities and yet allows for the possibility
of a distinctive role for international knowledge as opposed to
domestic knowledge. An increase in knowledge in one country,
holding knowledge elsewhere constant, could still lead to
diminishing returns because of, say, the costs of coordinating or
6comprehending knowledge in different countries. I show that
assumption (12) is not required for any basic theorem, though it is
used in the special case studied by Romer (1990) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991).
IntertemporalMaximization
To dynamize the Krugman-Dixit-stiglitz model of monopolistic
competition, consider a pure consumption loan model in which a
representative agent spends E(t) and earns Yet) at time t. The
agent maximizes
fii = j!!.~e=-(ln C(t))dt - ljr/e-R(tl[E(t) - y(t)]dt (14)
whereC(t) is an index of consumption at time t, p is the rate of
time preference, 1 is the present value of the marginal utility of
expenditure, R(t) = jr(t)dt (the cumulative discount factor), and
ret) is the instantaneous (nominal) interest rate at time t. The
index crt) might be utility or the production of some final
product. Let pet) =E(t)/C(t). At each t we can maximize (14) by
simply differentiating inside the integrals, obtaining
8fii/8C(t) = e=-[l/C(t)] - l~P(t) = 0,
implying
eR(t)-pt = l-E. (15)
since 1 is a constant, the time derivative of (15) implies
~/E = ret) - p. (16)
This is intuitive because if ret) > p, people will save for the
future causing expenditures to rise over time.
This is a general equilibrium model: only relative prices
matter. To achieve this a numeraire is required. GH make the
7assumption that E(t) = I. This implies, from (16), that at all
points in time, r(t) = p. Thus, P is the nominal rate of interest.
The Basic Model
To recapitulate: there is one productive factor--Iabor or human
capital--that.can be ..used ~to not··.only produce the differentiated
product, but also the blueprint for a new variety. The aJ variable
is the cost of a blueprint. Since new differentiated products
require devoting labor to creating a blueprint (IIR and 0"), we
shall sometimes refer to them as "high-tech" goods. It is assumed
that it always takes exactly I unit of labor to produce I unit of
iinyil-igh-tech good for which there is a blueprint. Knowledge of
this blueprint is proprietary.
There is one firm producing each variety of the good.
Accordingly, the profit-maximizing condition in monopoly is simply
p = Me/a. Since a unit of each variety uses one unit of labor and
labor earns the wage, w, the price of each variety is the same:
p = w/a. (17)
Due to symmetry the output of each firm is the same so that x~ = x
for all k. There are n firms, so each firm sells E/pn units. The
profit of each firm is [using (17)]:
Tl = E(p-w) /pn = E(I-a) /n (18)
Since a = w/p is the cost of $1 worth of product, the fraction (I-
a) may be interpreted as the profit on one dollar of sales.
The rest of the model consists of conditions describing free
entry, full employment, and one guaranteeing that there are no
arbitrage profits from buying and selling firms. A two country
8world does not substantially complicate the model. A complete
description follows.
The World Economy
Countries A and B have the same tastes (a and p) and it costs ~
unit of labor ,in either country to produce a unit of the high-tech
good. As in the Krugman model, we abstract from comparative
advantage and focus only on scale effects. World commodity
markets are integrated, with country j producing nJ varieties of
the differentiated good. Again, world expenditure E is normalized
to unity. Expenditure on country j's goods is given by sJ, where
~sJ = ~ = E. If there is international capital mobility, ~ = rI.
It follows from (16) that r = p in each country at each point in
time. If there is no international capital mobility, in the steady
state the nominal interest rate is p in each country.
As before every good in country j sells for the same price
because wages and the markup are the same. Thus, in country j,
each variety sells for
pJ = wJ/a. (19)
Multiplying both sides of equation (8) by pJ, we can see that
the share of world expenditure on country j's goods will be:
sJ = nJ(pJ)l-·j[~lnl(p!)bJ. (20)
A closed economy can be examined just by letting s1 = ~.
The profit of each firm in country j is now
lTJ = (sJ/pJnJ) (pJ - wJ) = sJ(l-a)jnJ , (21)
which is obvious because sJ/nJ is the dollar sales of each firm in
country j and (~-a) is the profit per dollar of sales.
9Firms will engage in R&D if the value of a monopoly exceeds
the cost of research and development. If Vi is the present value
of the future stream of profits from a monopoly in country j, the
free entry condition is described by:
wiai ~ .v-l, (22)
where
.Iii (wiai - Vi) = 0, (23)
implying the formation of new products or firms, .Iii > 0, whenever
wiaJ = vJ (24)
Grossman and Helpman call (24) the free entry condition. This is
appropriate because new products and entry are the same. Thus, if
new products or new firms are prohibited, then it would be possible
for Vi > wJaJ•
There can be no arbitrage profits from an entrepreneur keeping
the firm or selling the firm. The no-arbitrage condition is:
1fJ + yJ = pvJ , (25)
where the left-hand-side is the gain from keeping the firm and the
right-hand-side is the gain from selling the firm each period.
Finally, there must be full employment. The supply of labor,
LJ, can produce blueprints or goods. The full employment condition
is:
aJ.lii + sJ/pi = LJ. (26)
This can be seen by remembering each blueprint requires a J units of
labor and .liJ blueprints are created at each moment; and each unit
of the high-tech product produced requires 1 unit of labor and
there are Si/pJ units of these.
10It should be noted that in the interpretation of this model LJ
can be interpreted as the stock of human capital (Romer, 1990).
When there is only one factor, which can be used to produce either
new knowledge or old goods, then we are dealing with the allocation
of human capital between different activities.
Workings of the Model
This is a model in which we have trade in differentiated products.
There are economies of scale because to invent a new product
requires wJaJ worth of fixed costs. Each country specializes in
some non-overlapping subset of the n = n~ + n! available goods.
If we assume that there are technological spillovers,
economies will grow over time because fixed costs fall with the
number of products, increasing the entry of new firms. We seek to
examine the steady-state properties of the model.
It is convenient to summarize the basic model:
MARKUP PRICING p1 = wl/a (19)
EXPENDITURE IN COUNTRY J sl = nl(p1)!:!./[I;J.n!(p!)!:!'J (20)
FIRM PROFITS IN COUNTRY J 'Ill = sl(1.-a) /nl (21)
FREE ENTRY wlal = vl (24)
NO ARBITRAGE PROFITS 7Cl + yl = pvl (25)
FULL EMPLOYMENT alit! + sl/p1 = Ll (26)
We begin with a set of lemmas that hold when the two countries
do not face the same technology for innovation. It is instructive-
-but not crucial to the remaining argument--to begin with the
fairly obvious lemma that the high wage country has lower profits.
Lemma 1. n!> > «) 'If! iff ~ < (» W!.
11(27)
to
Proof. substitute (19) into (20) and (20) into (21). SO
7TJ = (wJ/a)b.(~-a) / [n~ (wf!./a)b. + nl! (wJ!/a).!..:.!.]
Since € > ~, arise in wJ lowers 7TJ.
Remark. This result is useful in dealing with models in
which the ~nnovation technoloqy aJ differs between countries and
holds on or off any steady-state growth path (see Grossman and
Helpman, p. 224).
Definition. A steady-state is where the rate of growth gJ =
~J/nJ, the allocation of labor to research and production, and the
market share sJ are constant.
Lemma 2. In a steady-state, the wage rate, wJ is constant.
Proof. From the full employment equation and the pricing
equation we can write
aJ~J + sJa/wJ = LJ.
since in a steady-state sJ and the allocation of labor
production must be constant, wJ must also be constant.
Lemma 3. In a steady-state, n1/nJ is constant.
Proof. From the expenditure share equation, (20), and the
pricing equation it follows that
s~/sl! = (n~/nl!) (wf!./w1!)b..
Therefore, since the sJ's and the wJ I s are constant in a steady-
state, so is the ratio n~/nl!.
Remark. The preceding three lemmas hold without any
assumption concerning the nature of technological spillovers.
These are very weak results. For example, lemma 3 is consistent
with equal growth rates in both countries or unequal growth rates
12when the shares are either zero or one. For deeper results we
introduce the assumption that the productivity of innovation is
subject to constant returns to scale.
Lemma 4. In a steady-state, if a J = a J (n"', n!) is homogeneous
of degree -1, 'then nJaJ is 'Constant.
Proof. Homogeneity of degree -1 implies that
nJaJ(n"', n!) = aJ(l, n'lnJ). (28)
In the steady-state, n'lnJ (lemma 3) is constant; thus, (28) implies
that nJaJ is constant.
Lemma 5. In a steady-state, if a J (.) is homogeneous of degree
-1, the aggregate value of the stock market of all firms, yJnJ , is
constant and equals sJ(I-a) / (gJ + p) •
Proof. By free-entry, wJaJnJ = yJnJ. Since wJ and nJaJ are
constant in the steady-state (lemmas 2 and 4), so is yJnJ. Now
divide both sides of (25) by yJ and add ilJInJ to both sides and
using the definition of profit in (21) we have
yJ lyJ + ilJ InJ = p + gJ - sJ (I-a) /yJnJ • (29)
The market share, sJ, is constant in a steady-state. The left-
hand-side of (29) is the proportionate change in yJnJ; therefore,
the left-hand-side is zero in the steady-state. Thus,
yJnJ = sJ(l-aj/(p + gJ). (30)
Remark. This is a useful result. It is intuitive because
sJ(I-a) is the total profit of firms in country j and (p + gJ) is
the rate of interest plus rate of decline in profits. In effect,
we can think of gJ as the rate of obsolescence because the profits
13of old firms decline as new firms enter. The stock market value of ,
all firms is just a present value of profits when there is perfect
foresight about the obsolescence rate of decline in profits.
We will now consider the implications of an additional
assumption: that aJ{nt>, nl!) = alnt>, nil) for j = A, .B, that is, the
knowledge production function is the same across countries.
Theorem 1. If a J (.) = a(.) for j = A, B and is sUbject to
constant returns (homogenous of degree minus one), the steady-state
growth rates are the same, that is, g& = ga = g.
Proof. Follows immediately from lemma 4. since nJaJ is
constant, it follows that (K = (dx/dt)/x)
~J + ~J = 0
If at> = al!, it follows that g& = g!.
Corollary 1. If a J (.) = a(.) for j = A, B and is sUbject to
constant returns, then st>/vt>nl! = sl!/~nl!.
Proof. Follows from lemma 5 and Theorem 1 by simply noting
that vJnJ/sJ = (l-Cl.)/(g+p) forj =A, B.
Remark. This results simply says is that if all production
functions are everywhere the same and sUbject to constant returns
to scale, the stock market value of each country is proportional to
the dollar value of sales in each country.
Corollary 2. If a J (.) = a(.) for j = A, B and is sUbject to
constant returns , then in the steady-state, na/nl! = L!>/Ll!.
Proof. The full employment condition (26) may be written as,
using the pricing equation (19),
14Using theorem 1 that under identical innovation technologies g6 =
~ = g, and the free entry condition (24), we can rewrite the above
equation as
nJag + asJa/vJ = LJ. (31)
Dividing (31) bynJ we get
ag + aasJ IvJnJ = LJ InJ • (32)
By the fundamental corollary 1 the left-hand-sides of (32) are the
same for j = A, B.
Remark. Corollary 2 gives a soothing message. If production
and innovation technologies are the same, and doubling the numbers
of goods in each country cuts innovation costs by one-half, the
number of varieties produced by each economy will be exactly
proportional to the size of each economy. It is interesting
because it states that in the steady-state the distribution of
human knowledge around the world is the same as the distribution of
human capital.
Theorem 2. If a J (.) = a(.) for j = A, B and is SUbject to
constant returns , then in the steady-state there is factor price
equalization, ~ = ~.
Proof. By the fundamental corollary 1 s~/s»' = ~n~/v!n»'.
Using the free entry condition we can write this as
s~/s»' = ~n~/~n»'. (33)
By inserting (19) into (20), taking the ratio we also get
s~/s»' = n~(~)~/n»'(~)~ (34)
Equating (33) and (34) we get
~/~ = (~/~)~. (35)
15For € > 1, as it must be, (35) holds if and only if wa = wi.
Remark. As in the standard factor price equalization theorem,
it is necessary to assume not only identical production functions
but constant returns to inputs and knowledge. In the case where
aJ = c/nJ , if n~ > n.!!, then it is cheaper to carry out innovations
in economy A. There will be uneven rates of innovation in this
case and factor price equalization will break down. But,
evidently, factor price equalization will also break down if aJ (.)
= a(.) for j = A, B but is not homogeneous of degree minus one.
Theorem 3. If aJ(.) = a(.) for j = A, B and is subject to
constant returns, then the steady state growth rate
g = i!/n = (l-a)Iz/a(O~, O.!!) - ap,
where Iz = IP + Ll and OJ = LJ/Iz.
Proof. writing down the full employment equation (26) and
using the markup (19), free entry condition (24), and theorem 1
that ~ = g.!! = g yields:
g = LJ/a(n~, n.!!)nJ - sJa/vJnJ. (36)
SUbstituting the aggregate stock market value from (30) into (36)
and rearranging yields:
g = (l-a)LJ/a(n~, n.!!)nJ - ap.
From corollary 2 it follows that LJ/Iz= nJ/n.




Since a(.) is homogeneous, we can let OJ = nJ/n = LJ/Izi thus
g = (l-a)Iz/a(O~, O.!!) - ap, (39)
where, of course, O~ + O.!! = 1.
Remark. Equation (39) is the basic endogenous growth equation
16when innovation costs are the same the world over and subject to
constant returns. It is obvious that the growth rate, g, must be
unique. If a(n~, n~) = el(n~ + n~), as in Grossman and Helpman, so
that a(8~, 8~) = e/~ = e, then we obtain the special case derived
by Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991):
g = (~-a)~/e - ap. (40)
In a single isolated economy,
gJ = (~-a)LJ Ie - ap. (41)
Clearly, mostly because of the broadening of knowledge spillovers,
an open economy sUbstantially increases a country's growth rate,
which is not true in neoclassical trade theory.
A study of equation (39) or (40) shows that the growth rate is
higher the higher the profit per dollar of sales, since the
expected reward from a monopoly will be higher; the larger the
population capable of engaging in R&D, since more innovation lowers
innovation costs due to spillover effects; the smaller the rate of
time preference, since a thrifty population faces smaller interest
rates and future profits have a higher present value.
The difference between (39) and (40) is in the role of the
distribution of human knowledge or (in the steady-state) human
capital (corollary 2). In the Grossman-Helpman-Romer equation,
(40), the distribution of human capital between countries A and B
is irrelevant to economic growth. But in the more general
model, equation (39), the distribution of human knowledge and,
therefore, human capital, matters. If there is a globally-known
production function for new knowledge, it may well be that
17redistributing human capital from a large country to a small
country would raise the world rate of growth. For example, if
~/a(O~, O!) = (O~O!)~, then the growth rate would be maximized by
letting endowments of the two countries be equal. This is clearly
an empirical 'question.
The theory implies that if two separate economies are not
closely linked they will have quite different growth rates and,
therefore, their levels of income might diverge through time. But
if two separate economies become sUddenly integrated, their growth
rates will both increase to a common level.
Finally, we inquire into the condition for the economy to
stagnate.
Corollary 3. The economy will stagnate (g = 0) if the real
interest rate is less than the rate of time preference.
Proof. We know that P(t)C(t) = ~, where crt) is utility or
some index of final consumption. From equation (10) we can write
C = n~x, where x is a constant, so that
~ + ~ = ~ + g/a = O.
The real interest rate is 6 = P - ~ = p + g/a. Using (39) we have
6 = (l-a)k/aa(O~, O!). (42)
Equation (39) can be rewritten as
g/a = [(~-a)k/aa(O~, O!) - p] = [6 - p]. (43)
Clearly, if 6 ~ p, the economy will stagnate at the initial stock
of knowledge, n.
Remark. Equation (43) is not surprising. In a Solow model
with the same intertemporal utility function as (14), the growth
18path for consumption is simply equal to the real interest rate
minus the discount rate (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, p. 33). This
suggests that if the stock of human capital is growing over time,
so should the real interest rate! This is equivalent to the
proposition, discussed by Romer (1986), that over time the rate of
growth of per capita income should be accelerating.
4. Schumpeterian Economic Growth
We have seen that when new firms enter, the profits of old firms
are reduced. This is a mild version of the creative destruction
models of Aghion and Howitt (1990), Segerstrom, et. al. (1990), and
Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 12).
Imagine that instead of horizontal product differentiation, in
which consumers bUy all varieties, consumers only buy the state-of-
the art product from each industry. Each industry is capable of
producing different qualities at the same marginal cost of W. But
consumers are indifferent between different qualities when they
sell for the same quality-adjusted price. It is assumed that firms
engage in Bertrand competition, so that the highest-quality firm
simply charges epsilon less than the price
P = AW, (44)
where A > 1 measures the quality advantage. The state-of-the-art
firm drives all other competitors out of business; accordingly, its
profits would be constant as long as it holds its monopoly power.
Thus, the first equation that is affected is the profit equation,
(21) .
But the firm faces the risk that an innovator will discover
19the next generation of the state-of-the-art quality. The only
other equation that is affected in the basic model is the no-
arbitrage condition, which becomes
'/[J +.:fJ = (I + p) vJ , ( 45)
where 1 is the,risk.of,losing.-one I·S monopoly position.
with sUfficiently careful assumptions, equations (44) and (45)
result in the same basic form of the Romer-Grossman-Helpman
endogenous growth equation, (40). For example, 1 is the
probability that a researcher will discover the next generation of
each good. If we assume that I also measures research intensity,
'So tha·t al measures the labor devoted to R&D, the free entry
condition simply becomes wal = IV because wal is the cost of
invention and IV is the expected value of a new product. Since the
I cancels, the free entry condition is the same as before. Except
for notational differences, the full employment equation is also
the same as before.
In terms of the final growth equation, the model is equivalent
to the horizontal product differential model because in that model
the growth of new products measures the extent to which profit
falls. In the rising product quality model, the firm faces the
risk that profits will remain constant and then, at some time in
the future, drop to zero with probability I. The I and the g play
the same role in the two theories: both discount future profits.
In the Schumpeterian model, the aggregate stock market value =
(total industry profit)j(p + I). This is the same form as (30);
accordingly, the Schumpeterian model has the same final equation.
20The Schumpeterian model is useful in analyzing the product
cycle (Segerstrom, et. aI, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, Ch. 12). At
different times the lead product goes back and forth between
countries.
IV. Conclusions
International trade theorists have for many years loosely
discussed how trade is advantageous for the new ideas and cultural
contacts that accompany international business. The gains from
these contacts may be of a different order of magnitude than the
traditional gains from specialization (comparative advantage or
economies of scale). Endogenous growth theory appears to offer to
trade theorists the possibility of formalizing the gains from new
ideas (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). So far the mechanism is only
that knowledge in the rest of the world may cheapen the cost of
creating new knowledge. It remains to study the microeconomic
details of this mechanism.
This paper has assumed that there is only one factor. But as
Grossman.and Helpman (1991) stress it is theoretically possible for
factor endowments to play a role in determining economic growth in
multi-factor, multi-sector models. If trade causes specialization
in goods that do not promote R&D, then with different knOWledge
functions different countries may have different growth rates. But
the empirical importance of this Heckscher-Ohlin effect remains to
be seen.
21Footnotes
1. To derive (8), first calculate the marginal utility from (7):
au/ax", = Ull = (Ex",f!) "fa - "xll,a-l'. (i)
Thus, setting
U",/U~= '(X",/x~)k;ll = Pt./~. (ii)
Let E = 1/(1-a). From (ii) we can then write
x", = (Pt./~)§.x~. (iii)
Substitute this in the budget constant E = r;",Pt.x"" yielding
E = ~§.x~r;Pt.il:.!1.. (iv)
2. Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 307) use a similar assumption
when they examine the implications of imitation when the South can







1990. "A Model of Growth
working Paper No. 3223.
Barro, Robert J. 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross section of
countries," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106: 407-443
De Long, J. Bradford, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1991.




Dixit, Avinash and stiglitz, Joseph E. 1977. "Monopolistic
Competition and Optimum Product Diversity." American Economic
Review 67: 297-308.
Ethier, Wilfred J. 1982. "National and International
Scale in the Modern Theory of International Trade.
Economic Review 72: 389-405.
Returns to
American
Gould, David and Roy J. Ruffin, "Human Capital Externalities, Trade
and Economic Growth," Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and the
University of Houston, November, 1992.
Grossman, Gene and Helpman, Elhanan. 1991. Innovation and Growth
in the Global Economy. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Krugman, Paul R. 1981. "Increasing Returns,




Krugman, Paul R. 1981. "Intraindustry Specialization and the Gains
from Trade." Journal of Political Economy 89: 253-266.
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. 1988. "On the Mechanics of Economic
Development." Journal of Monetary Economics 22:3-42.
Maddison, Angus. 1991. Dynamic Forces in capitalist Development:
A Long-Run Analysis. Oxford university Press, New York.
McNeill, W. H. 1963. The Rise of the West.
Chicago Press, chicago.
The University of
Ravera-Batiz, Luis A. and Paul M. Romer. 1991. "Economic
Integration and Endogenous Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics
106: 531-56.
Romer, Paul M. 1986. "Increasing Returns and long-Run Growth."
Journal of Political Economy 94: 1002-1037.
23Romer, Paul M. 1990. "Endogenous Technical change." Journal of
Political Economy 98: S71-S102.
Segerstrom, Paul S., Anant, T.C.A., and Dinopoulos, Elias. 1990.
"A Schumpeterian Model of the Product Life Cycle." American
Economic Review 80: 1077-1092.
24RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
Available, at no charge, from the Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank ofDallas, P.O. Box 655906
Dallas, Texas 75265-5906
9201 Are Deep Recessions Followed by Strong Recoveries? (Mark A Wynne and
Nathan S. Balke)
9202 The Case of the "Missing M2" (John V. Duca)
9203 Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Implications for Trade, Welfare and
Factor Rewards (David M. Gould)
9204 Does Aggregate Output Have a Unit Root? (Mark A Wynne)
9205 Inflation and Its Variability: A Note (Kenneth M. Emery)
9206 Budget Constrained Frontier Measures of Fiscal Equality and Efficiency in
Schooling (Shawna Grosskopf, Kathy Hayes, Lori Taylor, William Weber)
9207 The Effects of Credit Availability, Nonbank Competition, and Tax Reform on
Bank Consumer Lending (John V. Duca and Bonnie Garrett)
9208 On the Future Erosion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (William
C. Gruben)
9209 Threshold Cointegration (Nathan S. Balke and Thomas B. Fomby)
9210 Cointegration and Tests of a Classical Model of Inflation in Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Mexico, and Peru (Raul Anibal Feliz and John H. Welch)
9211 Nominal Feedback Rules for Monetary Policy: Some Comments (Evan F.
Koenig)
9212 The Analysis of Fiscal Policy in Neoclassical Models' (Mark Wynne)
9213 Measuring the Value of School Quality (Lori Taylor)
9214 Forecasting Turning Points: Is a Two-State Characterization of the Business
Cycle Appropriate? (Kenneth M. Emery & Evan F. Koenig)
9215 Energy Security: A Comparison ofProtectionist Policies (Mine K. Yiicel and
Carol Dahl)9216 An Analysis of the Impact ofTwo Fiscal Policies on the Behavior of a
Dynamic Asset Market (Gregory W. Huffman)
9301 Human Capital Externalities, Trade, and Economic Growth
(David Gould and Roy J. Ruffin)
9302 The New Face of Latin America: Financial Flows, Markets, and Institutions in the
1990s (John Welch)
9303 A General Two Sector Model ofEndogenous Growth with Human and
Physical Capital (Eric Bond, Ping Wang, and Chong K. Yip)
9304 The Political Economy of School Reform (S. Grosskopf, K. Hayes, L Taylor,
and W. Weber)
9305 Money, Output, and Income Velocity (Theodore Palivos and Ping Wang)
9306 Constructing an Alternative Measure of Changes in Reserve Requirement
Ratios (Joseph H. Haslag and Scott E. Hein)
9307 Money Demand and Relative Prices During Episodes ofHyperinflation
(Ellis W. Tallman and Ping Wang)
9308 On Quantity Theory Restrictions and the Signalling Value ofthe Money
Multiplier (Joseph Haslag)
9309 The Algebra ofPrice Stability (Nathan S. Balke and Kenneth M. Emery)
9310 Does It Matter How Monetary Policy is Implemented? (Joseph H. Haslag and
Scott E. Hein)
9311 Real Effects of Money and Welfare Costs of Inflation in an Endogenously
Growing Economy with Transactions Costs (Ping Wang and Chong K. Yip)
9312 Borrowing Constraints, Household Debt, and Racial Discrimination in Loan
Markets (Jolm V. Duca and Stuart Rosenthal)
9313 Default Risk, Dollarization, and Currency Substitution in Mexico
(William Gruben and John Welch)
9314 Technological Unemployment (W. Michael Cox)
9315 Output, Inflation, and Stabilization in a Small Open Economy: Evidence From
Mexico (Jolm H. Rogers and Ping Wang)9316 Price Stabilization, Output Stabilization and Coordinated Monetary Policy Actions
(Joseph H. Haslag)
9317 An Alternative Neo-Classical Growth Model with Closed-Form Decision Rules
(Gregory W. Huffman)
9318 Why the Composite Index of Leading Indicators Doesn't Lead
(EvanF.Koenig and Kenneth M. Emery)
9319 Allocative Inefficiency and Local Government: Evidence Rejecting the Tiebout
Hypothesis (Lori L. Taylor)
9320 The Output Effects of Government Consumption: A Note (Mark A Wynne)
9321 Should Bond Funds be Included in M2? (John V. Duca)
9322 Recessions and Recoveries in Real Business Cycle Models: Do Real Bnsiness
.Cycle Models Generate Cyclical Behavior? (Mark A Wynne)
9323 Retaliation, liberalization, and Trade Wars: The Political Economy of
Nonstrategic Trade Policy (David M. Gould and Graeme L. Woodbridge)
9324 A General Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth with Human and Physical
Capital: Balanced Growth and Transitional Dynamics (Eric W. Bond, Ping Wang,
and Chong K. Yip)
9325 Growth and Equity with Endogenous Human Capital: Taiwan's Economic Miracle
Revisited (Maw-lin Lee, Ben-Chieh lin, and Ping Wang)
9326 Clearinghouse Banks and Banknote Over-issue (Scott Freeman)
9327 Coal, Natural Gas and Oil Markets after World War II: What's Old, What's
New? (Mine K. Yiicel and Shengyi Guo)
9328 On the Optimality of Interest-Bearing Reserves in Economies of Overlapping
Generations (Scott Freeman and Joseph Haslag)
9329 Retaliation, liberalization, and Trade Wars: The Political Economy of
Nonstrategic Trade Policy (David M. Gould and Graeme L. Woodbridge)
9330 On the Existence of Nonoptimal Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Economies
(Jeremy Greenwood and Gregory W. Huffman)
9331 The Credibility and Performance of Unilateral Target Zones: A Comparison of
the Mexican and Chilean Cases (Raul A Feliz and John H. Welch)9332 Endogenous Growth and International Trade (Roy J. Ruffin)